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RESTITUTION: ANCIENT WISDOM
David F. Partlett* and Russell L. Weaver**
I. INTRODUCTION: AN ALLEGORY
Even crusty law professors go to the movies and, as youngsters,
read books of mystery and adventure. In thinking about restitution's
place in the law, we are reminded of J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the
Rings, because restitution seems to be an ancient wisdom that has
been lost to modem American jurisprudence. Although its spirit has
been kept alive by a smattering of legal hobbits, powerful forces are
trying to prevent a revival of the ancient wisdom. Nevertheless, non-
American scholars have kept the knowledge alive, and Americans
wait for a hero who will restore the wisdom to its rightful place.
Lord Mansfield's message is brought to a new day.' While we are
sure that Tolkien would never have thought that his mythology could
be so misused, so much license has been taken by Hollywood that we
hope you will bear with us as we spin out the need for a revival of
restitution.
This Article first explores the way in which restitution has been
lost in American jurisprudence. It suggests that a way back may be
found through a refocus on the elements of private law more
eloquently articulated on the pages of foreign law reviews and books,
and in the law reports of foreign courts. We then turn to a
pedagogical thesis in which we assert that our students may be more
appropriately taught restitution in a capstone remedies course where
an awareness of the panoply of remedial devices will prepare our
students to bring to the courts and to scholarship the type of revival
we call for in the first Section of our Article.
* Dean, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
** Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of
Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. See Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B. 1760).
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II. THE COMMON LAW WORLD DIVIDED
Restitution has found a most uncomfortable home in the
curricula of American law schools. It is a remnant of private law in
an era when private law is falling to public law analysis. 2 Voluntary
relationships, integrity of property, and equity are at the root of
restitution,3 yet those notions find little place in Torts, Contracts, and
Property courses. Much analysis in tort law is instrumental and
overrides the inter-party aspects of transactions. 4 Contract analysis is
also dominated by economic analysis that looks to the wealth
maximizing function of its rules. Property courses do not dwell on
theoretical underpinnings.
Restitution occupies a part of the Remedies course in most
American law schools. The Reporter's introductory memorandum to
the Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment bravely states that a "modem law of
restitution ... has met vastly increased academic interest and judicial
acceptance" but admits that, like the disappearance of the dinosaurs,
the law departed from the "curriculum in the mid-1960s."5 It did
have a "hey-day" with Dawson, Palmer, Seavey, Scott, and Wade,
but American scholarly champions are now gone.
By and large, American academics have deserted for the glories
of interdisciplinary work that imports to law the light of other
disciplines. 6 Indeed, American academics are generally disdainful of
the scholarship created in the rest of the common law world. It is
doctrinal, and to be doctrinal is the kiss of death for American law
2. For a recent example, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The
Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2001).
It is interesting that modem American regulation scholarship often
confronts public law issues, such as restitution for tobacco-related diseases.
See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999).
The claims of Nazi slaves and American slavery have occupied, and will
likely occupy, the attention of American scholars. See also Frederic L. Kirgis,
Restitution as a Remedy in US. Courts for Violations of International Law, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (2001).
3. See Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett, On the Subsidiarity of Unjust
Enrichment, 117 L. Q. REV. 273 (2001).
4. See id. at 295-96.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT xv
(Discussion Draft 2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
6. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Knowledge, and the Academy, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1277 (2002).
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professors' chances of tenure or professional respect. This attitude
has isolated American academic law and the teaching of law from
many fertile areas. This is particularly true of equity, where the law
has been stunted, and American academics have generally been blind
to the interesting and important work being done in the rest of the
world in the vineyards of restitution.
Because of this disdain, American academics have not given
restitution the close analysis that it deserves. Naturally, there are
exceptions. Douglas Laycock has made a real contribution to the
literature with his well-grounded arguments that restitution is gap-
filling in the same way that equity supplemented the common law.7
Andrew Kull has also produced insightful scholarship and is now
embarked upon the daunting Reporter's role in the Restatement.
8
But on the whole, the restitution arena has seemed too doctrinal,
almost too legal for modem American scholars.
9
We cannot reverse the trends in modem legal scholarship. In the
most recent Harvard Law Review a number of top-flight scholars
worry about law, knowledge, and the academy.' 0 Todd Rakoff, in
the introduction, talks of "embedded" and "non-embedded"
scholarship." Most restitution scholarship is embedded in the law.
It is out of kilter with the non-embedded state of modem legal
scholarship that prizes an external view of the law. Take Deborah
Rhode's critique of doctrinal or embedded scholarship. She contends
that it "exhaustively exhumes unimportant topics or replicates
familiar arguments on important ones. Too little effort is made to
connect law to life .... ,,12 "Worse still," she says, it "is too often
indifferent or oblivious to empirical and interdisciplinary
7. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67
TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989).
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at ix.
9. See, e.g., Symposium, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1763 (2001). For a broader and comparative analysis, see PATRICK S.
ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW (1987).
10. See Symposium, Law, Knowledge, and the Academy, supra note 6.
11. Todd D. Rakoff, Introduction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1285-87
(2002).
12. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1340
(2002).
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materials ... ."13 The enterprise of restitution scholarship, and of
much private law scholarship, especially non-American, is then
given little respect.' 4
Because of these trends in American scholarship, the field of
restitution has been left to non-Americans in the post-Second World
War period, with the most adept and receptive scholars being those
that have a connection with the old world of equity jurisprudence.
For example, many Australian High Court decisions, although overly
verbose and turgid, do take seriously the subtleties of the common
law. Take the recent case of Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall
Australia.'5 This case dealt with a variation of the mistakenly-paid
tax problem. 16  Usually, a plaintiff payor asks for restitution for
payment mistakenly made to the State. Here the plaintiff retailer of
tobacco had paid monies to the wholesaler. 17  The retailer had
increased the price of its product to reflect the "tax" imposition.'
8
The wholesaler had not handed over the relevant payments to the
State before the "taxes" were found unconstitutional. 19 The retailer
then made a restitutionary claim for the payment that represented the
"tax" portion.
20
The Australian High Court tackles the considerable doctrinal
difficulty with a depth that one would not find in United States
courts.2 1 Interestingly enough the High Court places great reliance
13. Id. at 1341. The "law and.. ." project can fail fatally as Anne M.
Coughlin reminds us in I'm in the Mood for Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 209 (2000)
(reviewing the law and literature in her critique of Guyora Binder & Robert
Weisberg, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000)).
14. Foreign scholars are sometimes seduced by American instrumental
analysis in approaching restitution. See Hanoch Dagan, Mistakes, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1795, 1810-11 (2001) (adopting a normative formula for restitution of
mistaken payments that minimize social costs). A rapprochement between the
substantive American judicial and legal method, and the more formalistic
method employed elsewhere, seems far off. See David F. Partlett, The
Common Law as Cricket, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1990).
15. (2001) 185 A.L.R. 335.
16. See id.
17. Seeid. at337.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Some would say that Canadian courts cast adrift from the jurisprudence
of equity have lumbered a little like a "bull in a china shop" in the area of
restitution.
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on American authority from the early part of the last century. 22 The
great lions are cited including Justice Cardozo's decisions in Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Florida23 and Wayne County Produce
Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co.,24 and Judge Learned Hand's 1946 dissenting
opinion in 123 East Fifty-Fourth Street, Inc. v. United States,25 but
surprisingly few modem decisions are deemed worthy of mention.
26
At the same time, restitution is an area where the nexus of legal
history with close doctrinal exegesis was particularly suited to those
not captured by the "law and.. ." projects. Restitution is one of the
finest hours of non-American legal scholars. It represents the
revenge of the much maligned rule-oriented scholars. One thinks of
Goff and Jones, of Birks and Burrows, with some of those at this
very forum. Reviewing a number of restitution books, Professor
Stephen Smith has concluded that over the past twenty-five years,
"unjust enrichment law" has witnessed the "most noteworthy
scholarly achievements in the area of private law. ... 27
III. THE FUTURE OF RESTITUTION IN THE CURRICULUM
To be sure, the American Law Institute may fan the restitution
flame in the United States. But, even if that happens, it is doubtful
that students will receive adequate exposure. The habits of mind
established by prevailing torts, contracts, and property analyses have
22. See Roxborough, 185 A.L.R. at 371-75.
23. 295 U.S. 301 (1935).
24. 155 N.E. 669 (N.Y. 1927).
25. 157 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand, J., dissenting).
26. The Australian High Court makes a comparison to United States v.
California, 507 U.S. 746, 751 (1993), but otherwise cites only older American
decisions. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (rejecting as a
defense for a refund of an unlawful tax that the over-charged party had passed
some of the costs of the tax onto customers); Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534
(1937); Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 348 (1937); United States
v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402 (1934); Decorative Carpets, Inc.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 Cal. 2d 252, 254-55, 373 P.2d 637, 639
(1962); Philpott v. Superior Court, I Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934); Standard
Oil Co. v. Bollinger, 169 N.E. 236 (I11. 929); Richardson Lubricating Co. v.
Kinney, 168 N.E. 886, 889-90 (Ill. 1929); Bd. of Highway Comm'rs v. City of
Bloomington, 97 N.E. 280, 283 (I11. 911); Shannon v. Hughes & Co., 109
S.W.2d 1174, 1177 (Ky. 1937); Chapman v. Forbes, 26 N.E. 3 (N.Y. 1890).
27. Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241,
256-57 (2000).
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taken firm root. When restitution is reached by some in the elective
Remedies course, it appears to be difficult to reconcile with earlier
law. It lacks roots. Too often, the sources of restitution are
unexamined and the law is approached through a sea of examples
where courts have afforded restitution in the form of a bedazzling
armory of equitable remedies. The status of restitution is left
unexamined and is assumed. Given the short time available, and
without the benefit of policy analysis, most students are befuddled by
this new creature-restitution. 28 Students have had, at this point, a
cynical view of legal rules. They view the doctrine as infinitely
malleable. For example, in the plastic realm of negligence, students
are accustomed to activist courts acting unconstrained by rules. The
realist strain lives and students wonder why, in the absence of
rigidity, should one have to call on equity or restitution to fill the
gaps in the law?
In our view, a deeper understanding of restitution would enrich
American law school curricula. The dominant regulator of rights and
duties (contracts, torts, and property) can be more thoroughly
understood by appreciating that a failure in the premises of those
rights and duties can precipitate a claim for restitution. The standard
is one that supports the liberal voluntary transaction base of the
common law. It lives in that netherworld of strict formal rights that
promote certainty, with rules that promote fair balancing and justice
between individuals. For example, sometimes the conditions of a
wealth transfer are such that the transfer cannot stand.2 9
In core courses, the pillars of the common law, restitution
doctrine deserves greater development. Often, no mention is made
of restitution except that the principle is one pertaining to the
measure of damages. Where substantive restitution is alluded to, it is
often mentioned in passing with no attempt to give context or a sense
of wider application to it. As is well known, quasi contract may
include a proper appreciation of unjust enrichment as the base of
restitution.30 In Torts, mistake and coerced transactions are referred
28. See Andrew Kull, The Simplification of Private Law, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 284, 291 (2001).
29. See Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett, On the Subsidiarity of Unjust
Enrichment, 117 L.Q. REv. 273, 275 (2001).
30. See id. at 276.
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to, but often without alluding to restitution and the equitable
remedies that may attach.31
The Remedies course introduces restitution. Too often, the roots
in unjust enrichment are inadequately explored, and students are left
with little sense of restitution's relationship to torts, contracts, and
property. The presence of restitution in the Remedies course
encourages the misperception that restitution is itself just a remedy.
Shortly after the subject of restitution is broached, the instructor
begins to focus on the remedial problems of tracing, equitable liens,
subrogation, and constructive trusts. Any concept that restitution
forms a separate substantive area of law is cut off at the origin.
The American Law Institute's ("ALT") efforts to create a second
Restatement of Restitution may revive the place of restitution in the
American legal curriculum.32  However, as we have argued, the
reception is likely to be less than welcoming. The ALI restatement
process has been most effective in areas where opinion-makers in the
legal academy and the judiciary have agreed on a course of
development. The prime example is the rapid adoption of section
402(A) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.33 The development of
strict liability for defective products was felt to be an idea whose
time had come.34 Moreover, the concept was simple and responsive
to the external policy perspective of enterprise liability.
Nevertheless, the Restatement is likely to make the body of
restitution law accessible to modem lawyers. The concern is
whether the translation of the Restatement to the courts will be subtle
and responsive to the purposes of the law.
IV. LOST MEMORIES
Giants once roamed the land, but the memory is lost. Only in
other common law countries has the restitution mantle been picked
up. Patience with the common law method of case development and
acceptance by the academy has led to an "embedded" debate about
the scope and nature of restitution.35 Ironically, it may be that the
31. See id. at 295-96.
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at xi.
33. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 623-24 (1992).
34. See id. at 620.
35. The discussion at a gathering of restitution scholars differs markedly
from a gathering of leading American tort scholars. The Articles in this
Winter 2003]
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Restatement will have a greater initial impact on non-American
jurisprudence.
If restitution can be recaptured, it may lead to a revival of
Cardozian analysis in private common law.36 The Restatement will
draw comment particularly as it touches commercial relationships.
Just as tort, contract, and property have received attention, their
relationship with the subsidiary concept of restitution will force a
reappraisal. The scholarship accumulated mainly outside the United
States may be brought to bear on the rather old-fashioned enterprise
of taking the rules seriously.
37
V. DEALING WITH THE LOST RINGS
We hope that our analysis points out the costs of losing touch
with an entire body of developed legal knowledge. The law
developed in response to needs that are as present today as they were
in the pre-World War II era. The challenge is to equip a new
generation of lawyers with the tools to rediscover the principles of
restitution. Without a receptivity to the Restatement, to the
scholarship and court opinions outside the United States, and to the
learning of scholars and judges of an earlier era, American law is
fated to pass through a painful and costly reinvention of knowledge.
Symposium take seriously the issue of the internal consistency of restitution.
The hope is that they will lead to an understanding of the bar by application of
rigorous classification. Cf Smith, supra note 27, at 254 (proposing that even if
one disagreed with how unjust enrichment used to be classified, that
classification was intelligible and open to debate). Tort law is usually tied to
reference points outside the law itself, posing questions such as the deterrent
effect of the rule or its capacity to internalize the costs of accidents. Thus,
Dean Green observed that tort law was public law in the guise of private law.
Dean Prosser, although he possessed and exhibited strong analytical skills in
reordering tracks of tort law, was a thorough realist. For a defense of tort law
as law, not social policy, see John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 657, 731 (2001).
36. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1419,
1456-61 (1999) (explaining Cardozo's approach to a case analysis).
37. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipurski, The Moral of
Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1807-12 (1998); Goldberg, supra note
36, at 1456-61; see also Partlett, supra note 14, at 1422-28 (describing the
advantages and drawbacks of formalism); Smith, supra note 27, at 249-56
(arguing that "doctrinal scholarship provides the best way of understanding
law").
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This leads us to one overarching question: how can we, as law
professors, best accomplish the task? No doubt, we will have to
possess the passion and patience to readdress the law of restitution.
This will require us to perform the careful Cardozian task of
attending to the details of the rules and looking at how they operate
38in concrete factual settings. 8 The knowledge will then live in our
graduates and find its way to the courts. So, we are hoping for a
reemphasis on restitution in the basic Remedies course.
VI. TEACHING THE BASICS
Even if restitution is taught in Remedies, rather than as a
separate course, there are certain basic principles that students need
to learn. Of course, they need to learn the underlying concept,
"unjust enrichment," and they need to gain some appreciation for the
variable nature of the concept. Because most first-year courses are
focused on their own limited subject matter (i.e., torts, contracts,
property), first-year students often gain only a limited understanding
of restitution's nature and the variability of recovery. As discussed
more fully below, even though two cases seem to be similar, factual
variations can lead to dramatically different levels of recovery.
For example, defendant steals black walnut timber from
plaintiff's land and uses it for studs in his new home. As timber, the
wood has a value of $20,000. As studs, the wood has a value of
$2,000. Defendant argues that he used the wood for studs, and that
stud-quality wood would have cost him only $2,000. Plaintiff, by
contrast, argues that defendant actually stole wood worth $20,000.
Even though defendant used the wood in a way that provided him
only with $2,000 of value, the court will award plaintiff $20,000
because of the way the wood was taken (theft) and the fact that
defendant actually received $20,000 in value. The fact that
defendant chose to use the wood in a way that failed to realize the
full value is his problem.
On the other hand, on similar facts (defendant uses black walnut
timber for studs), suppose that the fault lies with plaintiff rather than
defendant. Assume that defendant ordered wood from a lumberyard,
making it clear that he wanted to use the wood as studs. However,
plaintiff mistakenly sent defendant expensive wood, black walnut
38. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 1461.
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wood worth $20,000, rather than stud-quality wood worth $2,000. If
defendant fails to notice the mistake, there might be no "unjust
enrichment" so that plaintiff can recover only the contract price
($2,000). The fact that the mistake was due to plaintiffs error is
highly relevant. Various factors can affect whether a particular case
involves "enrichment" as well as whether the enrichment is
"unjust. 39  So, students need to gain at least a rudimentary
understanding of restitution precedent and principles.
One of the challenges of teaching restitution is that, as students
begin to appreciate the power of restitutionary remedies, they see
unjust enrichment in every context and want to make broad use of
the special restitutionary remedies (i.e., the constructive trust, the
equitable lien, and tracing). In other words, students tend to take the
vague concept "unjust enrichment" and apply it too broadly. In fact,
the availability of restitutionary remedies is significantly limited by
restitution precedent: restitution and restitutionary remedies are
available in some types of cases, but not in others.40 In addition,
courts have imposed significant limitations on certain restitutionary
remedies. 41 Students need to study this precedent, or at least some of
it, so that they understand the scope of restitution and the limits
imposed thereon.
Once the core is established, students should be led to
understand the "special restitutionary remedies": constructive trust,
equitable lien, and tracing. In their first-year courses, some students
have been introduced to these concepts. So, when students arrive in
Remedies, they have a rudimentary understanding of the principles.
But students often do not understand the importance of combining
tracing with a constructive trust or equitable lien, and do not
understand how these equitable devices can gain plaintiffs important
advantages that can make the difference between a meaningful
recovery and a nearly complete loss.42 In addition to learning these
39. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. a.
41. See Frambach v. Dunihue, 419 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
42. For example, defendant defrauds plaintiff, takes his money, and invests
it in real estate. When plaintiff sues, he realizes that defendant is bankrupt and
that many creditors are vying for the money and property that remain. If
plaintiff can succeed in tracing his money into the land, he may be able to
assert a constructive trust or equitable lien (as appropriate) on the land, and
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advantages, students also need to understand the limits of these
restitutionary remedies and devices. Tracing is not always permitted,
and constructive trusts and equitable liens are not always available.
43
VII. INTEGRATION
But, if restitution is to assume its rightful place in the curriculum
and the law, faculty need to teach more than just the basics. They
need to teach restitution in an integrated way. Indeed, that is part of
the advantage of the Remedies course: it offers students the
opportumity to see law in an integrated way that prepares them for the
practice of law. Part of the problem with law school is that students
often see the law in limited contexts or "pigeonholes." In first-year
courses, students have studied remedies, but they have usually done
so in isolated contexts. In other words, they see tort remedies in their
Torts class, contract remedies in their Contracts class, and property
remedies in their Property class. This isolation of remedies may be
effective and necessary, but it makes it more difficult for students to
see remedies from a comprehensive perspective.
A comprehensive perspective is both necessary and desirable.
Practicing lawyers do not confront remedial problems in a
pigeonholed way. Few clients walk into a lawyer's office and
express their legal dilemma in subject-specific ways (e.g., "I have a
tort problem involving conversion and want to talk to you about the
availability of injunctive relief and damages."). More commonly, a
client pours out a sad story involving an unorganized mixture of
relevant and irrelevant facts and asks for help. The lawyer's tasks
are to sort through the facts, to separate the wheat from the chaff, to
decide how the case should be framed, and to evaluate remedial
options. As the lawyer performs these tasks, the lawyer may cut
across subject matter boundaries. Indeed, in a given case, a lawyer
may have to evaluate remedial options involving tort, contract, and
thereby gain priority over other creditors. See In re Radke, 619 P.2d 520, 525
(Kan. Ct. App. 1980). Without restitution, plaintiff stands in line with the
other creditors and receives only pennies on the dollar.
43. For example, Cunningham v. Brown is the case that gave rise to the
term "Ponzi scheme." See 265 U.S. 1, 7 (1924). Essentially, defendant
constructed a pyramid scheme in which he took some people's money and
passed it on to others. When the scheme collapsed, some victims tried to use
tracing and restitution to gain a priority over other victims. The court rejected
the claim as an unlawful preference.
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restitutionary claims. In addition, the lawyer may have to evaluate
remedial options involving damages, injunctive relief, and special
restitutionary devices.
A Remedies course is an appropriate home for restitution.
Students have a base of knowledge within the established private law
categories. They will have had some introduction to restitution and
should relish the opportunity to investigate its place and justification.
Provided the course avoids the peril of treating restitution as a mere
remedy, restitution will be properly seen as filling those gaps that
should have troubled students as they exited their Torts, Contracts,
and Property classrooms. By the time they reach the second or third
year, students are hungry to view the law in a more integrated and
comprehensive way. Moreover, students are more capable of
studying topics like restitution and analyzing those topics in context.
Indeed, since third-year students will be practicing in a year, they
need to begin the transition from looking at law in pigeonholed ways
to perceiving it more creatively and subtly. Few law school courses
offer students this opportunity.
The interplay of restitution and remedies offers a unique
opportunity to begin the transition from student to lawyer. Skills that
students need to acquire include an approach for evaluating diffuse
facts and an idea about how to form these facts into coherent and
effective causes of actions. A necessary aspect of this evaluation
involves consideration of the relationship between causes of action
and remedial options. As any good lawyer knows, one's choice of a
particular cause of action can affect and limit the lawyer's remedial
options.
For example, suppose that defendant steals plaintiffs prize bull
that is worth $20,000. Obviously, plaintiff can sue in conversion for
the value of the bull at the date of the conversion. Also, plaintiff
might use injunctive relief or a modem replevin statute to get the bull
back. But restitution is an option as well. As a result, good
lawyering necessarily requires evaluation of competing causes of
action and remedial options, including restitutionary options.
Of course, an essential aspect of lawyering is fact investigation
and analysis. In order to competently evaluate causes of action and
remedies, one needs to know quite a bit about the facts. Under
modem pleading rules, a lawyer can plead multiple and inconsistent
causes of action, and can learn more about the facts in the discovery
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process. 44 But, at some point, the lawyer will be forced to make an
election of remedies. In addition, depending on what the facts
reveal, the lawyer might want to bring in other defendants. The
factual investigation might necessarily entail asking a variety of
questions including the following: What did defendant do with the
bull? Did he keep it? Did he sell it? To whom? For how much?
What did he do with the proceeds? Did he butcher the bull for the
meat? Did he use the bull to inseminate cows? Did offspring result?
Depending on the answers to these questions, a lawyer might seek to
combine both restitutionary and non-restitutionary remedies.
In Remedies, students have the chance to learn the importance
of fact investigation and analysis, and to gain some practice. For
example, as students analyze the problem mentioned in the prior
paragraph, the answers they receive can push them to pursue certain
remedies rather than others, and can encourage them to sue certain
defendants rather than others. To illustrate, suppose that defendant
sold the bull, dissipated the proceeds and is otherwise insolvent. It
might make little sense to sue defendant for damages.4 5 However, it
might be worthwhile to sue the purchaser for conversion. In
addition, if plaintiff still wants the bull back, it may make sense to
seek replevin or injunctive relief against the purchaser (assuming that
he/she still has it). On the other hand, suppose that defendant sold
the bull to a stockyard for butchering, and then dissipated the
proceeds. If the bull was actually butchered, replevin and injunctive
relief may make little sense (unless plaintiff wants the meat). In
addition, if defendant is insolvent, it again makes little sense to sue
defendant. But, once again, plaintiff might sue the purchaser for
conversion.
Other factual variations might encourage plaintiff to use other
causes of action and other remedies. Suppose for example that
defendant kept the bull and used it to inseminate his cows. If
plaintiff no longer wants the bull back, plaintiff could again sue in
conversion. If plaintiff does want the bull back, plaintiff could seek
replevin or injunctive relief. But these remedies do not provide
plaintiff with complete relief if the bull's semen has been used to
produce offspring or to produce pregnant cows. In such situations,
plaintiff could use tracing to follow the bull's semen into the
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (e)(2).
45. See DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.17 (2d ed. 1993).
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offspring, or into a mother cow's uterus, and then attempt to impose
either a constructive trust or equitable lien on the offspring.
Other factual variations might lead plaintiff in quite different
directions. Suppose that some time has elapsed between the date of
theft and the date of suit. During this time, defendant sold the bull
and invested the proceeds in real estate. Subsequently, the value of
the real estate rose significantly. Otherwise, defendant has no
money, and does have a large number of creditors. In such
circumstances, it makes sense to trace the bull into the proceeds and
then into the real estate. It might also make sense to try to impose a
constructive trust or an equitable lien on the real estate. At the very
least, these remedies should allow plaintiff to recover the value of the
bull. Whether plaintiff could also gain the increased value of the real
estate might be more debatable, but plaintiff can at least make a
claim.
Is it possible to bring fact and claim analysis into the remedies
course? We think so. Students can be given a more sophisticated
problem (i.e., the bull problem set forth above), but the professor can
include only those facts (both relevant and irrelevant) that a non-
lawyer client might provide to a lawyer. At that point, students can
be allowed to engage in discovery against "defendant" by sending
interrogatories to their professor. As students gain more information,
they may decide to join other defendants and subject those
defendants to interrogatories as well. At the end of the project, the
students can be asked to write a comprehensive memo analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of competing causes of action and
remedial options.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An ancient wisdom has been lost to modem American
jurisprudence. Although its spirit has been kept alive by isolated
hobbits, it is time for a revival of the wisdom and time for a modem
torchbearer to take up the cause of restitution. Despite the modem
disdain for embedded scholarship, we suggest that a revival in
common law legal method is needed if the ancient wisdom is to be
restored to its rightful place and if restitution is to be treated as
something more than an oddity of the law and the curriculum. We
further claim that restitution can find a highly useful home in a
properly constructed remedies course, and will provide a flow of
988
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well-prepared lawyers alert to the potency of private law to enhance
our remedial system of law.
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